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There has been a slow but steady evolution in how eyewitness researchers and the 
criminal justice system view the relationship between the accuracy of a witness’s initial 
identification and the confidence that the witness expresses in that identification. This 
evolution is most clearly illustrated in a comparison of the conclusions drawn by Sporer, 
Penrod, Read, and Cutler (1995) with those drawn by Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, 
and Roediger (2015). Sporer et al. concluded, 
Experts probably should, at a minimum, advise jurors that witness confidence is one, but 
only one, indicator of witness accuracy. The testimony should emphasize that confidence 
is far from a perfect indicator of witness accuracy (p. 324) 
whereas Wixted et al. concluded, 
Jurors should consider the level of certainty expressed by an eyewitness during the initial 
identifications (at which time confidence is likely to be a reliable indicator of accuracy) 
while disregarding the level of certainty expressed at trial (because, by then, confidence 
may no longer be a reliable indicator of accuracy). (p. 516) 
In their expansive and ambitious article, Wixted and Wells (2017; this issue) discuss that 
evolution within the broader context of eyewitness-identification research and reform. 
Their main conclusion is that “when pristine identification procedures are used, 
eyewitness confidence is a highly informative indicator of accuracy, and high-confidence 
suspect identifications are highly accurate” (p. xxx). This raises two questions, which we 
take up in turn: What does it mean for identification procedures to be pristine? And what 
if the identification procedures are not pristine? 
Pristine Identification Procedures 
Wixted and Wells answer the first question by describing five characteristics that define 
pristine identification procedures (see their Box 3, p. xxx): 
1. The lineup should include only one suspect. 
2. The suspect should not stand out in the lineup. 
3. The witness should be instructed that the offender might not be in the lineup. 
4. The lineup should be administered using a double-blind procedure. 
5. The statement of confidence should be obtained at the time of the identification. 
Wixted and Wells present a detailed argument in favor of these pillars of pristine 
procedures, which we need not repeat here. We should note, however, that although there 
may be good reason to adopt these standards, there is very little evidence that they 
increase the diagnostic accuracy of a suspect identification (Clark, 2012; Gronlund, 
Mickes, Wixted, & Clark, 2015). Thus, knowing whether the lineup procedure was 
pristine may be relatively uninformative about the defendant’s guilt or innocence, in 
contrast to knowing the witness’s confidence. 
That said, some pillars are more important than others with respect to the specific issue of 
the confidence-accuracy relationship. We would argue that the fifth pillar is different 
from the other four in that it is not about the identification procedure per se but about the 
confidence judgment that is to be considered. On this point, Wixted and Wells make a 
compelling argument that confidence can change over time as witnesses are exposed to 
other sources of information that could influence their confidence (feedback from law 
enforcement, news reports about the case, etc.). To the extent that such post-identification 
information can potentially distort a witness’s confidence, we agree with Wixted and 
Wells, and with the U.S. Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), that the first 
expression of confidence made at the time of the identification is likely to be more 
informative than expressions of confidence made weeks, months, or years later when the 
witness testifies in court. 
What If the Identification Procedures Are Not Pristine? 
Denying the antecedent: “If” ≠ “if and only if” 
The idea of pristine lineup procedures looms large in Wixted and Wells (2017), and it is 
clear that the confidence-accuracy relationship is strong if eyewitness-identification 
procedures conform to the pristine characteristics they describe. However, it would be 
easy to misinterpret the “if” clause as an “if and only if” clause—that is, as saying that 
the confidence-accuracy relationship holds if and only if the identification procedures are 
pristine. Such a misinterpretation would constitute a logical fallacy of denying the 
antecedent. The claim “if pristine lineup procedures are used, then confidence is highly 
diagnostic of accuracy” does not mean “if pristine lineup procedures are not used, then 
confidence is not highly diagnostic of accuracy.” 
To be clear, Wixted and Wells (2017) do not make that claim. At the risk of appearing 
tedious, it is important to carefully parse the claims that Wixted and Wells do make and, 
importantly, the claims they do not make. They write: 
The results [of the analyses] will show that when pristine identification procedures are 
used, eyewitness confidence is [emphasis added] a highly informative indicator of 
accuracy, and high-confidence suspect identifications are highly accurate. We go on to 
demonstrate that the confidence-accuracy relationship can be [emphasis added] 
compromised when certain non-pristine identification procedures are used. . . . (p. xxx) 
We have emphasized key terms that are not highlighted in the original, specifically that 
confidence is highly informative—as a general rule—when the conditions are pristine 
and that the confidence-accuracy relationship can be compromised when the conditions 
are not pristine. Thus, Wixted and Wells make no claim that any or all deviations from 
pristine identification procedures will compromise the accuracy of identifications as a 
general rule. 
Wixted and Wells (2017) also write that “there are known conditions under which 
confidence clearly informs accuracy and other known conditions under which it clearly 
does not” (p. xxx) and that “when certain [emphasis added] non-pristine testing 
conditions prevail (e.g., when unfair lineups are used), the accuracy of even a high-
confidence suspect ID is seriously compromised” (p. xxx). The key here is that serious 
compromising occurs under certain, but not any or all, deviations from pristine 
conditions. Specifically, their analyses show that accuracy is compromised when lineups 
are unfair. 
Non-pristine identification procedures: Unfair lineups 
The certain non-pristine testing condition to which Wixted and Wells (2017) refer is the 
unfair or biased composition of a lineup. The critical data from confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) curves are shown in their Figure 6 (p. xxx). Their analyses show 
that confidence and accuracy are strongly related even for unfair, biased lineups, but that 
the accuracy of high-confidence suspect identifications is lower for biased lineups than 
for unbiased lineups. In other words, the slopes of the CAC curves appear to be about the 
same irrespective of whether the lineups were biased on unbiased, but the asymptote of 
the CAC functions is lower for biased lineups than for unbiased lineups. Again, it is 
important to carefully parse the claims that Wixted and Wells make: “These findings 
underscore the critical point that our claims about the relationship between confidence 
and accuracy (and, in particular, the very high level of accuracy usually associated with 
high-confidence suspect IDs) apply to fair lineups, not to unfair lineups” (p. xxx). The 
key point here is that although “the accuracy of even a high-confidence suspect ID is 
seriously compromised” (p. xxx), the data nonetheless “exhibit a strong relationship 
between confidence and accuracy” (p. xxx), even for unfair lineups.1 
Confidence over pristineness 
A potential problem that arises from the misinterpretation of “if” as “if and only if” is that 
it implies that jurors should not consider the confidence of the witness if there is any 
deviation from pristineness (thereby translating the error of denying the antecedent into 
jury instructions). However, if one accepts the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court that 
the basic purpose of a trial is the determination of the truth (Tehan v. US, 1966) and that 
when it comes to eyewitness-identification evidence, reliability is the “linchpin” for 
determining admissibility (Manson v. Brathwaite, 1977), then jurors should be presented 
with all relevant evidence—subject to exclusions under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(2017). That is, evidence should be presented that “has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” (p. 6) and jurors should give 
more weight to evidence that has greater probative value. In other words, jurors should 
consider confidence in their evaluation of eyewitness-identification evidence2 because it 
is more informative with respect to accuracy than the pristineness of the identification 
procedures. 
One criterion that Wixted and Wells (2017) identify as necessary for an eyewitness 
identification condition to be considered pristine is that the witness was told that the 
perpetrator may not be in the lineup. However, that tells the trier of fact little about the 
accuracy of the witness’s identification. The research shows that such instructions reduce 
the likelihood that witnesses will make an identification but have very little effect on the 
accuracy of identifications. 
In a recent study, Mickes et al. (2016) compared results from confidence ratings versus 
different biasing instructions. They used four different sets of instructions, two of which 
are of interest here. In these two conditions, participants either received or did not receive 
the instruction, “The person from the video may or may not be in the lineup.” Both 
conditions yielded suspect-ID accuracies of 93%.3 Thus, in this experiment, informing 
laboratory witnesses that the offender may not be in the lineup did not matter. 
The same bottom line was suggested by a meta-analysis of studies that varied the 
instructions to the witness (Clark, Moreland, & Gronlund, 2014). The results suggested 
that instructions that the suspect may not be in the lineup shift the witness’s response 
criterion, which affects choosing rates but is unlikely to affect the confidence-accuracy 
relationship.4 As a consequence, if jurors were instructed to attend to the nature of the 
instructions but ignore the confidence of the witness, this would be tantamount to an 
instruction to carefully consider non-diagnostic information and ignore diagnostic 
information. 
Another criterion that Wixted and Wells (2017) consider necessary for pristine 
eyewitness-identification procedures is that the lineup administrator should be blind. 
Although there are good reasons for blind lineup administration, and there is evidence 
that non-blind lineup administrators can influence witness confidence through feedback 
(which may be intentional or unintentional, explicit or implicit), there is also evidence 
that lineup administrator influence can strengthen the relationship between confidence 
and accuracy. Clark, Brower, Rosenthal, Hicks, and Moreland (2013) found that 
experimental witnesses who were steered to identify the suspect by a non-blind lineup 
administrator did so with no change in confidence for correct identifications of the guilty 
but with lower confidence for false identifications of the innocent. In other words, their 
confidence was an important diagnostic cue revealing their likely (in)accuracy. Thus, the 
mere fact that a lineup was non-pristine because it was administered by a non-blind 
administrator cannot be assumed to automatically compromise the information value of 
eyewitness confidence (and Wixted and Wells do not claim that it does, only that it can). 
Pristineness Is a Moving Target 
The analyses presented by Wixted and Wells (2017) suggest a very stable relationship 
between confidence and accuracy. In contrast, the research on the indices of pristine 
lineup procedures is relatively inconsistent (for reviews, see Clark et al., 2014; Gronlund 
et al., 2015). Only 6 years ago, eyewitness-identification researchers might have listed the 
sequential presentation of the lineup as a necessary component of pristine identification 
procedures (Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). Now, the superiority of the sequential 
lineup over the traditional simultaneous lineup has been challenged (National Research 
Council, 2014), and the U.S. Department of Justice (Yates, 2017), in its recently revised 
guidelines, suggests that sequential presentation may produce identification evidence that 
is less accurate, not more accurate, than simultaneous presentation. Thus, what was 
pristine 6 years ago is not pristine today. 
Likewise, regarding lineup composition, Wixted and Wells (2017) note in very general 
terms that the index of pristine lineup composition is that the suspect should not stand 
out. However, previous prescriptions for pristineness were much more specific. The U.S. 
National Institute of Justice (1999) was very clear that proper lineup composition was 
achieved by selecting fillers that match a description of the perpetrator, not by selecting 
fillers based on their similarity to the suspect. This more specific instruction for 
composing lineups has been adopted by many law enforcement agencies, but the research 
does not support it (Clark, 2012; Clark et al., 2014). This provides another example of a 
condition once considered pristine falling out of favor. 
Conclusion 
Eyewitness-identification research is in the midst of a major revision. Wixted and Wells 
(2017) have laid down a strong case for a revision regarding the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy, a revision with which we strongly agree. But readers should be 
careful not to assume that the fact that pristine conditions should be aimed for means that 
they are always necessary for confidence to hold diagnostic value. Furthermore, the broad 
assumption that the relationship between confidence and accuracy holds only under 
pristine testing conditions is not supported by data. In some cases, such as when lineups 
are biased, Wixted and Wells’s analysis shows that confidence is still strongly associated 
with accuracy, even though the asymptotic level of accuracy is lower. In other cases, 
more research needs to be conducted in order to evaluate the relationship between 
confidence and the pristineness of the identification procedures. 
Note that we are not arguing against instructions to the eyewitness that the perpetrator 
may or may not be present, blind lineup administration, or the construction of fair 
lineups; rather, we argue that the confidence-accuracy relationship, involving an initial 
lineup test, may provide useful information even if those procedures are not followed. 
Legal rules and jury instructions to consider confidence only when pristine conditions 
hold could focus jurors on less diagnostic information (indices of pristineness) rather than 
more diagnostic information (confidence), which would undermine the truth-seeking 
mission of the legal system. 
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Notes 
1. Although the quote is specifically in reference to the data from Gronlund et al. (2012), 
the strong relationship appears to hold for all of the studies whose results are depicted in 
Figure 6 (p. xxx). 
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence do allow for the exclusion of relevant evidence if its 
probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial impact. However, given the strong 
probative value of a witness’s initial expression of confidence, it would be hard to argue 
for its exclusion, particularly on the basis of whether other “pristine” rules were followed, 
given their lower probative values. 
3. Confidence was not collected in these conditions, so this value includes guess 
responses. Had confidence been collected, the high-confidence responses would most 
likely have been even higher in accuracy. 
4. There is some evidence that biased instructions may actually strengthen the 
confidence-accuracy relationship. Steblay (1997) noted that biased instructions increased 
the confidence of identifications for target-present lineups but had minimal effect on 
identifications for target-absent lineups. 
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